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Abstract
Suicide rates in Greece (and other European countries) have been on a remarkable upward
trend following the global recession of 2008 and the European sovereign debt crisis of 2009.
However, recent investigations of the impact on Greek suicide rates from the 2008 financial
crisis have restricted themselves to simple descriptive or correlation analyses. Controlling for
various socio–economic effects, this study presents a statistically robust model to explain the
influence on realised suicidality of the application of fiscal austerity measures and variations
in macroeconomic performance over the period 1968–2011. The responsiveness of suicide
to levels of fiscal austerity is established as a means of providing policy guidance on the
extent of suicide behaviour associated with different fiscal austerity measures. The results
suggest (i) significant age and gender specificity in these effects on suicide rates and that
(ii) remittances have suicide-reducing effects on the youth and female population. These
empirical regularities potentially offer some guidance on the demographic targeting of suicide
prevention measures and the case for ‘economic’ migration.
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1. Introduction
Greece has historically had one of the lowest suicide rates in the world, peaking in 1993
and then following a downward trend until 2008. However, in the aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis it has increased markedly, with even a case of public suicide of a 77-year-
old Greek pensioner shooting himself with a handgun in the head in front of Syntagma
Square, one of the capital’s busiest main squares near the Greek Parliament (Kitsantonis,
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2012). Suicide rates in Greece and other European countries have been on a remarkable
upward trend following the global recession of 2008 and the European sovereign debt crisis
of 2009 (see, for instance, Kentikelenis et al., 2011; Economou et al., 2011; Kentikelenis
et al., 2012; Fountoulakis et al., 2012; Karanikolos et al., 2013). This period coincided with
the implementation of fiscal austerity in Greece (and in other Eurozone countries), soaring
unemployment rates and negative economic growth. Fiscal austerity refers to measures
taken by governments (during downturns of economic activity) to reduce expenditures and
increase tax revenues in an attempt to cut excessive levels of government budget deficits
and debts. There are numerous empirical studies on the determinants of suicide rates which
indicate that recessions and rises in unemployment rates are associated with suicide rates
(see, the comprehensive survey and review of literature provided by Chen et al. (2012)
and the key literature highlighted in Chen et al. (2010)). However, none of the reviewed
studies specifically focuses on the effects of fiscal austerity (public expenditure reductions)
on suicide. This is a phenomenon that particularly affects individuals on fixed incomes
(such as state pensions) and as such is likely to impact differently on various age cohorts.
Suicides are becoming more common in Greece, and in addition to pension effects, budget
cuts have also restricted access to health care and medicines. The study of Karanikolos et al.
(2013) suggests that the fiscal austerity might have contributed to an epidemic of suicides
in Greece, among other Eurozone countries. Yet, a systematic investigation to address the
effect of fiscal austerity on suicidality in Greece is still lacking since Karanikolos et al. (2013)
and others in the medical literature have hitherto adopted approaches based exclusively on
descriptive analysis and correlation analysis.
To address this gap in the literature, we specifically investigate the effects of fiscal aus-
terity, among other socio-economic control variables, on suicide rates in Greece. To support
this study we use data collected over the period 1968-2011.
Our empirical findings suggest that fiscal austerity, higher unemployment rates, negative
economic growth and reduced fertility rates lead to signicant increases on overall suicide rates
in Greece, while increased alcohol consumption and divorce rates do no exert any signicant
influence on overall suicide rates. Interestingly, the effects of fiscal austerity and economic
growth are gender-specific, as fiscal austerity measures and negative economic growth sig-
nificantly increase male suicide rates, while no significant effects from fiscal austerity and
negative economic growth on female suicide rates could be identified. In addition, the effects
of fiscal austerity on suicide rates are also age-specific, as fiscal austerity affects mostly the
population between 45 and 89 years of age. Finally, remittances have suicide-reducing effects
on the youth and female population.
These results have important implications for policy makers, and for the creation and
implementation of specialised suicide prevention programmes in Greece by national health
agencies. From an economic policy perspective, our results suggest that Eurozone leaders
should put greater emphasis on stimulating their economies instead of fiscal consolidation
and austerity, if they wish to mitigate some or even all of the negative effects of fiscal austerity
on suicide rates. While, from a health policy perspective, specialised suicide preventions
programmes focusing on the most distressed part of the population should be established.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents some brief remarks
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on the extant theory relating to suicide, outlines the sources of our theoretical expectations
and sets out our key research hypotheses. Section 3 provides a background of the economic
crisis and the increased suicidality in Greece, while Section 4 describes the empirical method-
ology and the data used. Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 summarises
and offers some concluding remarks.
2. Key Hypotheses
Suicide has long been the subject of theoretical and empirical scrutiny. Durkheim (1897)
and other sociologists in their wake have posited a positive relationship between suicide
and age premised on the level of social regulation in a given society. Economists too have
entered the arena led by Hamermesh and Soss (1974) who advanced a rationality driven
model of suicide founded on an assessment of the likely expected cumulative lifetime utility.
On this basis, they also posit a positive relationship between suicide rates and age, and
an inverse relationship with permanent income which can be expected to boost expected
cumulative lifetime utility. Based on the extensive and very comprehensive review of studies
presented in Chen et al. (2012), this study extracts a full set of a priori expectations for
the macroeconomic performance and demographic control variables based on the consensus
readily discernible in the literature. These are set out in Table 2. However, in the context of
fiscal austerity (specifically public expenditure reductions) we posit the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 : Fiscal austerity (public expenditure reductions) is positively related to the
suicide rate.
Hypothesis 2 : Fiscal austerity will impact significantly differently across age cohorts. Specif-
ically, we postulate that older age cohorts will be more likely to commit suicide as a con-
sequence of fiscal austerity than younger age cohorts, given their reliance on fixed incomes
and arguably less suicide offsetting behaviours (such as migration) being perceived to be
available to them. For those individuals subject to pension reductions, clearly their perma-
nent income is directly impacted and as Hamermesh and Soss (1974) would indicate this is
posited to increase the suicide rate.
3. Background and context: Economic Crisis and Suicide in Greece
Since the advent of the Eurozone government debt crisis, extraordinary measures were taken
by individual governments and the European Central Bank (ECB) so as to prevent a po-
tential collapse of the Eurozone (see, for instance, Roman and Bilan, 2012). Among them,
the Greek government found underreporting of the budget deficit by nearly 50%, shortly
after the Greek elections, in November 2009. According to the study of Rauch et al. (2011),
macroeconomic data, such as the budget deficit and debt, among others, reported by Greece
shows the greatest deviation from Benford’s law (that is used to detect manipulated data)
among all euro member states. In particular, on 5 November 2009, the Greek public sector
revised its budget deficit to 12.7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the 6% originally
disclosed, which was then revised once again to the unprecedented 15.6% in November 15,
3
2009 (see, Figure 1). This event initiated a sovereign debt crisis that has resulted in large
financial interventions in Greece and other Eurozone countries. As a consequence, fears of a
Greek sovereign default on its debt and possible contagion to other Eurozone countries were
developed among investors, that led to a crisis of confidence and a widening of bond yield
spreads and credit default swaps between several Eurozone members and the Eurozone’s
largest economy, Germany.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
At that point of time, Greeces options were limited, as the Greek government ruled out
leaving the Euro, which instantaneously ceased the possibility of using a currency deval-
uation so as to increase competitiveness and possibly reduce its budget deficit and public
debt. Instead, after time-consuming negotiations between the European Commission, the
European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), (the tripartite
committee led by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, that organise loans to the government of Greece, among other
countries, is also known as ‘Troika’) it was decided to offer a e110 bailout package on May
2010 to Greece so as to finance and service its debt. However, this bailout loan was accom-
panied by strict conditions, including: (i) austerity measures, such as drastic curtailing of
government spending and large increases in tax rates, (ii) large privatisation of government
owned assets worth of e50 billion by the end of 2015, and (iii) strict implementation of
structural reforms, so as to improve its competitiveness and growth prospects.
Indeed, Greece accepted the bailout package and started applying austerity measures,
implementing structural reforms and privatising its government owned assets in order to put
its economy back to a long-term sustainable path.
Conventional wisdom suggests that fiscal austerity has contractionary rather than expan-
sionary effects. Contrary to conventional wisdom Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Alesina and
Ardagna (2010) have argued that fiscal consolidations may be expansionary if implemented
mainly by cutting government spending. Few will contest the effects of fiscal austerity on the
economy, such as soaring unemployment rates and sharp declines in GDP (see, for instance,
Stiglitz, 2012; Krugman, 2012; Beetsma et al., 2012; Guajardo et al., 2011; Bluedorn and
Leigh, 2011; IMF, 2010). Besides, one of fiscal austerity’s core aims in Greece has been to
achieve large scale reductions in public sector employment. But what are the implications of
fiscal austerity measures for health in Greece? Put differently, what are the effects of fiscal
austerity on suicide rates in Greece?
The recent financial and economic crisis has raised major concerns in the public health
community that suicide rates will rise across the globe. Since then, an increasing amount
of research on the effects of financial and debt crisis, and of unemployment on suicide rates
in Greece has been conducted (see, among others, Fountoulakis et al., 2013, 2012; Rihmer
et al., 2013; Kentikelenis et al., 2012; Economou et al., 2011; Kentikelenis et al., 2011;
Stuckler et al., 2011, 2009). Suicides are becoming more common in Greece, and budget
cuts have restricted access to health care. Yet, the literature on the effects of fiscal austerity
on suicide rates, according to the best of our knowledge, is absent.
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4. Data and Methodology
4.1. Data
We collect annual observation of overall, male and female suicide rates for Greece from
the World Health Organization (WHO) Mortality Database between 1968-2009, and we
extend them up to 2011. In particular the 2010 figure is estimated based on data cited in
Kentikelenis et al. (2011), while the 2011 figure comes from Kathimerini (2012), a Greek
newspaper which cites police records. The unemployment data come from the Annual Macro-
Economic (AMECO) database. The evolution of these series presented in Figure 2 are
revealing. In particular, overall suicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants increased by 30.69%
from 391 suicides in 2009 to 511 suicides in 2011. A similar percentage increase is observed
for male suicides (from 333 to 435) and female suicides (from 58 to 76) during the same
period, however, female suicides are much lower than male suicides throughout the sample.
In addition, overall unemployment rates increased from 7.7% in 2009 to the unprecedented
17.7% in 2011, and male and female unemployment rates increased from 6.9% to 15% and
from 13.1% to 21.4%, respectively, between these two periods.
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
According to Figure 2, unemployment rates and suicide rates seem to be highly corre-
lated. Indeed, the correlation between overall suicide rates and unemployment rates over the
period 1968–2011 is 0.45, while between male suicide rates and male unemployment rates
and between female suicide rates and female unemployment the correlation is 0.76 and -0.50,
respectively, over the period of 1980–2011. The link between suicide and unemployment is
much stronger for males than females, indicating the necessity to look at gender–specific
suicide rates. In addition, there is clear evidence that suicide rates increase with age for
both males and females.
Table 1 presents suicide rates by time, age group and sex for a selection of years. Ac-
cording to this table, there is also clear evidence that suicide rates increase with age, and
that males are more prone to commit suicide than females are, which are in line with the
theoretical justications of Hamermesh and Soss (1974) and Durkheim (1897).
[Insert Table 1 around here]
In order to examine the effects of fiscal austerity on suicide rates, we use several variables
as proxies of fiscal austerity. Given the large scale reduction in public sector salaries and
pensions in Greece, our principal proxy of fiscal austerity is government expenditure. We
collect data for general government final consumption expenditure as a % of GDP from
the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database. According to the World
Bank’s WDI definition, general government final consumption expenditure (formerly gen-
eral government consumption) includes all government current expenditures for purchases
of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most expendi-
tures on national defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures that
are part of government capital formation. Given that this measure might produce biased
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results during period when nominal GDP is falling, such as the period of the financial crisis,
we have explored the robustness of our results by dividing general government final con-
sumption expenditure by real GDP. Our results, which are available upon request, remain
qualitatively and quantitatively almost identical. This is due to the fact that the correlation
between the two alternative measures is very high, namely 0.7868. For robustness purposes
we also use taxes, budget deficit and public debt as proxies of fiscal austerity (see below).
In addition, we collect data on per capita real GDP growth from WDI so as to examine
the effects of business cycles on suicide mortality. Finally, to control for social factors on
suicide rates and to minimize errors arising from unobserved effects, we collect data for
fertility rates from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) database; alcohol
consumption from OECD Health database and divorce rates from EUROSTAT. Definitions
and descriptive statistics for all these variables are included in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 around here]
4.2. Empirical Methodology
Our baseline equation to be estimated is as follows:
SRit = α + β1SRit−1 + β2Growtht + β3Fiscalt + β4Unempt + β5Fertt + β6Alct
+ β7Divt + εt (1)
where SRit is the natural logarithm of suicide rates per 100,000 of i population, where i =
overall, male, female, over time t, where t = 1968, ..., 2011. SRit−1 is the first lag of SRit and
is included to account for dynamic effects and to filter autocorrelation of order one, AR(1),
found in the series. Growtht denotes per capita real GDP growth. Fiscalt is fiscal austerity
which is proxied by either: (i) the first difference of the natural logarithm of government
expenditure as a % of GDP, Gov Expt, (ii) the first difference of budget deficit as a % of
GDP, Deft, and (iii) the first difference of the natural logarithm of tax revenues as a % of
GDP, Taxt. Fertt is the fertility rate, Unempt is the unemployment rate, Alct is litres of
per capita alcohol consumption, Divorcet is the divorce rate and εt is the error term which is
assumed to be independently and identically distributed (IID) with zero mean and variance
σ2 for all t.
The rationale for including these variables follows the recent literature (for instance, see
an excellent survey by Chen et al., 2012). Andre´s (2005) and Viren (2005) show that eco-
nomic growth has a significantly negative impact on suicides. If positive economic growth
brings better occupational and financial prospects for the future, people will be hopeful and
the probability of committing suicide may decrease. Likewise, unemployment can be con-
sidered to be a predictor of future income, therefore rising unemployment rate should lead
to an increase in the incidence of suicide and suicide attempts. In addition, unemployment
may be associated with mental and/or physical illness, which could lead to suicide. Accord-
ing to the seminal work of Durkheim (1897), suicide mortality is also influenced by social
regulations and integration. From this angle, divorce and fertility rates can be viewed as
indicators of social integration. In particular, Durkheim (1897) posits that divorce reduces
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social integration and family ties. Divorce can cause perceived shame, stress and ultimately
result in risky behaviour such as suicide. Therefore, higher divorce rates are likely to be
related with higher suicide rates (see, for instance Minoiu and Andres, 2008; Neumayer,
2003, among others). In a similar vein, fertility rates can also be viewed as an indicator of
social integration, and thus high fertility rates would be associated with lower suicide mor-
tality, supporting a negative relationship between social integration and suicides. Andre´s
(2005) and Durkheim (1897) show that high fertility rates are related with lower suicide
mortality as the absence of children is associated with more fluidity in family integration
and social ties. Finally, Neumayer (2003) and Andre´s (2005) find that, individuals with a
higher alcohol consumption are more likely to commit suicide.
5. Estimation results
5.1. Baseline results
Results of various specification of model (1) for the overall, male and female population are
presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5, respectively. According to the results of Table 3, most of
the socio-economic variables have a significant impact on overall suicide rates in Greece. In
particular, the estimated parameter of the lagged dependent variable and of real per capita
GDP growth have a statistically significant positive and negative effect, respectively, on
overall suicide rates. These results suggest that suicides are of persistent nature and that
negative output growth leads to higher suicide rates. The latter finding is line with the
arguments that economic growth helps to reduce suicide rates (see, e.g., Neumayer, 2003,
among others).
[Insert Table 3 around here]
The estimate of fiscal austerity, proxied by percentage changes in government expen-
diture, on overall suicide rates is negative and significant at the 10% or 5% level under
columns (3)–(6). This result denotes that reductions in government expenditure are asso-
ciated with increased suicide rates. According to the ‘best’ specification (determined by
the goodness-of-fit statistic and the statistical significance of the variables included) under
column (5) of Table 3, a 1% decrease in government expenditure leads to a 0.3% increase
on overall suicide rates in Greece. That is, 0.3% is the semi-elasticity of suicide rates with
respect to fiscal austerity. To put things into perspective, final consumption government
expenditure as a % of GDP has been reduced by 11.3% between 2009 and 2010 resulting
in a (11.3% × 0.3% =) 3.39% increase in suicide rates solely due to fiscal austerity. Given
that the number of the overall suicides in 2009 and 2010 was 391 and 488, respectively, 13
out of the 97 (13.4%) who committed suicide between 2009 and 2010 were only because of
fiscal austerity. And given that the population of Greece in 2009 was 11,260,402 according
to Eurostat, the 3.39% increase in suicide rates corresponds to 381 suicides in Greece due
to austerity measures between 2009 and 2010.
The coefficient of unemployment rates is positive and statistically significant under
columns (4)-(6) denoting that higher unemployment leads to increased suicide rates and
which is in line with Andre´s (2005) and Gerdtham and Johannesson (2003).
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Moreover, our findings suggest that increased fertility rates reduce suicide rates, while
alcohol consumption and divorce rates do not exert any significant influence on overall suicide
rates in Greece.
Although our estimation results for male suicide rates in Table 4 are not substantially
different from those of the overall suicide rates, real per capita GDP growth and fiscal
austerity measures do not have a significant effect on female suicide rates, as shown in Table
5. The effects of fiscal austerity on male suicide rates reported in Table 4 suggest that a
1% decrease in government expenditure leads to a 0.43% increase in male suicide rates in
Greece. That is, (11.3% × 0.43% =) a 4.86% increase in male suicide rates, or 19 out of
the 102 males (18.6%), or 551 males among the Greek population who committed suicide
between 2009 and 2010 in Greece was solely due to fiscal austerity.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
[Insert Table 5 around here]
These results have important implications for policy makers and for the creation and
implementation of specialised suicide prevention programmes in Greece by national health
agencies. From a economic policy perspective, our results suggest that Greek officials, as
well as Eurozone leaders, should put greater emphasis on stimulating the Greek and other
debt-stricken economies, instead of fiscal consolidation and austerity, so as to mitigate some
or even eliminate all of the negative effects of fiscal consolidation and austerity on suicide
rates. While, from a health policy perspective, specialised suicide preventions programmes
focusing on the most distressed and vulnerable citizens in Greece should be established, as
the empirical literature supports the idea that the correct diagnosis of suicide determinants,
and the creation of suicide prevention programmes can lead to a reduction, if not prevention,
of suicides (see, for instance, McKee et al., 2012; Matsubayashi and Ueda, 2011, among
others).
However, the Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection of the European
Commission, despite its legal obligation to assess the health effects of EU policies, has been
rather inactive in terms of assessing the effects of the troika’s drive for austerity, and has
instead limited EU commentary to advice about how health ministries can cut their budgets.
Only until recently, the European Commission begun measures to release structural funds,
according to “the role of health as part of the Europe 2020 policy framework” to support
access to health care for those otherwise without cover (see, for instance EC, 2013). The
complete EU’s Health Strategy “Together for Health” that supports the overall Europe 2020
strategy is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/health/strategy/policy/index_en.htm.
5.2. Robustness analysis
As a robustness check, we also examine how fiscal austerity affects suicide rates by utilising
different proxies of fiscal austerity, and by examining different age groups effects.
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5.2.1. Alternative proxies of fiscal austerity
In this section, we estimate model (1) but with government budget deficit as a % of GDP
(obtained from the AMECO database) as proxy of fiscal austerity instead of government
expenditure as a % of GDP. In particular, we include the first difference of government budget
deficit as a % of GDP, Deft. Given the discovery of underreporting the fiscal balance by
the Greek government, one of the main concerns has been its reduction, even its elimination
and the return to budget surpluses. Therefore, we are very interested to examine whether
and how deficit changes affect suicide rates in Greece. The results of this analysis for the
overall, male and female population are reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8, respectively.
[Insert Table 6 around here]
[Insert Table 7 around here]
[Insert Table 8 around here]
According to these tables, the effects of reductions in the budget deficit have a positive
and statistically significant, albeit limited, effect on overall suicide rates, as the estimated
parameter of Deft is significant only at the 5% or the 10% level, under columns (3) and (4)
of Table 6, respectively. Distinguishing between male and female population, we observe
that reductions in budget deficits lead to increased male suicide rates, while no significant
effects on female suicide rates could be identified. In particular, under column (4) or (5)
of Table 7, a 1% reduction in the government deficit leads on average to a 1% increase in
male suicide rates in Greece. Put differently, the reduction in the budget deficit as a % of
GDP by 4.77% between 2009 and 2010 resulted ceteris paribus in a (4.77%× 1% =) 4.77%
increase in male suicide rates. Given that the number of male suicides in 2009 and 2010 was
333 and 416, respectively, 16 out of the 83 (19.3%) who committed suicide between 2009
and 2010 were only because of fiscal austerity. Given that the male population of Greece in
2009 was 5,499,396 according to Eurostat, the 4.77% increase in suicide rates corresponds
to 262 suicides in Greece solely due to austerity measures between 2009 and 2010. As an
additional robustness check, we repeated the above analysis with government tax revenues as
a % of GDP, and then with government debt as a % of GDP (both series obtained from the
AMECO database) instead of deficit as proxies of fiscal austerity. We also included private
debt as a % of GDP obtained from the AMECO database so as to examine whether increases
in private debt lead to increased suicides. These results, which are available upon request,
suggest that changes in the government tax revenues as a % of GDP, or in government debt
as a % of GDP, or in the private debt as a % of GDP do not exert any significant influence
on either overall, male or female suicide rates. These results are plausible due to the large
amount of tax evasion in Greece. However, these results should be interpreted with caution,
as the number of observations is very limited due to data unavailability for these series
during the early years of our sample, and the goodness-of-fit statistic, R2, is relatively low.
In particular, the starting date for the deficit variable is 1988 and thus our results might be
biased due to the limited number of degrees of freedom.
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5.2.2. Fiscal austerity and suicide rates by age groups and gender
Several studies have found evidence of age and/or gender dependent effects of socio-economic
variables on suicide rates (see, for instance, Pitman et al., 2012; Andre´s, 2005; Neumayer,
2004; Markowitz et al., 2003; Jungeilges and Kirchgassner, 2002, among others). Thus, we
now examine whether the effects of fiscal austerity (among other socio-economic variables)
on suicide rates are also age and/or gender specific. To achieve that, we estimate model (1)
with the dependent variable, SRit, now denoting the natural log of the suicide rates by four
age groups, namely, 10–24, 25-44, 45-64 and 65-89 years, and by overall, male and female
groups.
Before discussing these results, we present some descriptive statistics on suicide rates for
these four age groups and by gender in Table 9. It is clear from this table that suicide rates
increase with age, which is in line with theoretical arguments of Hamermesh and Soss (1974).
In addition, male suicide rates are consistently higher than female suicide rates throughout
all age groups.
[Insert Table 9 around here]
Even though, suicide rates are the highest for the age group 65-89 years, Figure 3 shows
a declining trend of suicide rates for this age group, and especially for females, since the
beginning of the 1990s. Interestingly, suicide rate for both gender of that age group fell
below those of the age group 45-64 years in 2003 and 2009.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
The results of model (1) by the four age groups for the overall population are presented
in Table 10. According to this table, our findings suggest age-specific effects of suicide rate
determinants.
[Insert Table 10 around here]
First, none of the socio-economic variables, apart from the lagged dependent variable,
have a significant impact on suicide rates for the age group 10-24 years. This result is
plausible, as there might be other individual risk factors for suicide rates in the young
population, such as childhood and personality disorders and drug dependence (Pitman et al.,
2012). More importantly, the young stricken population faced with austerity measures often
emigrates (alone or as young couples). Given their flexibility they can potentially mitigate
some or all of the negative effects of fiscal austerity. Ultimately, we would like to include
emigration as another explanatory variable, however, data on emigration are very limited
and feature many gaps. However, we are able to overcome this issue below where we conduct
another robustness check with emigration proxied by the inflow of remittances. We postulate
that inflow of remittances are a good proxy of emigration as many people who emigrate
usually transfer a part of their income to support their stricken families left back in their
home country.
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Second, and more importantly, fiscal austerity proxied by reductions in government
spending leads to a significant increase in suicide rates for the age group 65-89 years (columns
(7) and (8) of Table 10) and 45-64 years (column (6) of Table 10). This is very plausible
as those age groups include the largest parts of the population in Greece that have been
heavily affected by large scale reductions in their pensions and salaries, respectively.
Third, negative economic growth leads to a significant increase in suicide rates for the
age groups 25–44 and 65–89 years (columns (3)–(4) and (7)–(8) of Table 10), and, to a
smaller extent, for the age group of 45–64 years (column (6) of Table 10).
Fourth, unemployment is a significant determinant of increased suicide rates for the
age group 25–44 years (columns (3)–(4) of Table 10) and, to a smaller extent, of reduced
suicide rates for the age group 65–89 (column (7) of Table 10), while no significant effects
of unemployment on suicide rates for the age groups 10–24 and 45–64 could be identified.
Therefore, our results suggest that the unemployment-stricken population between the years
25 and 44, i.e., the most highly productive and skilled part of the labour force, have a higher
probability to commit suicide if they become unemployed compared to the population in any
other age group. In particular, a 1% increase in unemployment rates leads to 3.5% increase
in suicide rates for the age groups 25–44 years (column (3) of Table 10).
Fifth, the estimated parameter of fertility rates is negative and statistically significant
only for the age groups 25-44 and 45-64 years. These results suggests that only the declines in
fertility rates of the most fertile population between the ages of 25 and 64, lead to significant
increases in suicide rates in Greece.
Finally, the estimated parameters of alcohol consumption and divorce rates are paradox-
ically significantly negative for the age groups 45–64 and 65–89, respectively, indicating that
alcohol consumption and divorce rates reduce suicide rates for these age groups in Greece.
Next, we examine whether our previous findings in each of the four age groups are gender
specific. In Tables 11 and 11, we report the results for males and females, respectively, in
each of these four age groups.
[Insert Table 11 around here]
[Insert Table 12 around here]
The results of these tables reveal gender specificity in addition to age group specificity. In
particular, fiscal austerity measures significantly increase the suicide rates of males between
the ages of 45 and 89. Again this result is very plausible, as those age groups include the
largest parts of the population in Greece that have been heavily affected by large scale
reductions in their pensions and salaries, respectively. Moreover, downturns of economic
activity, such as recessions, significantly increase only males suicide rates between the ages
of 10 and 44, and 65 and 89. Females between ages of 10 and 89 seem to be insulated to
periods of negative economic activity and to implementation of austerity measures in Greece,
as there are no significant effects recorded related to changes in government expenditures
and economic growth on female suicides. The only exception are females between the ages of
65 and 89, as negative economic growth increases suicide rates in that age group of females.
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In addition, reduction in fertility rates increases suicide rates of both gender and across
almost all age groups. However, the effect is more pronounced for the female population in
the most fertile ages rather than those of the male population, as the estimated parameters
are larger in the former group compared to the latter. For instance, a 1% reduction in
fertility rates leads to a significant increase of 2.54% in female suicide rates between the
ages of 25 and 44, while only to 1.68% in male suicide rates of the same age groups.
Furthermore, increases in unemployment only of males between the years of 25 and 64
lead to significant and fourfold increases in male suicides. A 1% increase in unemployment
of males between the ages of 25 and 44 leads to a significant increase in suicide rates of
around 4.5% for this age group of the male population in Greece. In the case of females
across all the different age groups, we observe a negative effect of unemployment on suicides.
This negative relationship between female unemployment and suicide rates is in line with
Kuroki (2010). Using semi–aggregate level data for Japan, the author obtains a coefficient of
-0.05 which is similar to ours of around -0.078. See Kuroki (2010) for a discussion about the
mixed findings on the unemployment–suicide relationship across genders and age groups.
Turning to effect of divorce rates on suicide, we observe that the significantly negative
effect found for the age group of 65–89 years in Table is driven by females. That is, an
increase in divorces leads to a significant reduction in female suicides between the ages of 65
and 89. This may seem plausible if marriage serves to over–regulate the lives of women. In
that case, increasing divorce rates may be, among others, the result of financial independence
for women, laws favouring women in financial settlements and women’s search for identity
and freedom. Therefore, divorce rates may be associated with lower female suicide rates
(see, for instance, Neumayer, 2003; Andre´s, 2005; Koo and Cox, 2008, among others).
Last but not least, alcohol consumption is not significantly associated with suicides of
neither genders nor across different age groups.
As a final robustness check, we include inflow of remittances obtained from the World
Bank database as an additional explanatory variable in model (1) so as to proxy emigration
and examine its effects on suicide mortality. In particular, we include the first lag of inflow
of remittances so as to allow their effects to be fully materialized. We have also repeated
the analysis with current inflow of remittances and the results, which are available upon
request, remained qualitatively identical. The results, with lagged inflow of remittances as
an additional explanatory variable, are presented in Table 13. For the sake of brevity, in
Table 13 we present a subset of the most relevant results. Full results are available from the
authors upon request.
[Insert Table 13 around here]
The inclusion of remittances in model 1 suggests the following empirical regularities.
Increases in remittances reduce significantly suicide rates for the age group between 10 and
24 years of age and female suicide rates, while no significant effects on remittances on overall,
male and for the population with age between 25 and 44 years could be identified. These
findings are very plausible as, in most of the cases, the male member of the family works
abroad and sends money back to his family. Moreover, our results indirectly suggest that
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emigration reduces suicide rates in the younger population in Greece, as many individuals
under 24 years of age emigrate for a better future and income. They send money home, easing
off some of the huge reductions in personal incomes and therefore reducing significantly the
risk of committing suicide. Put differently, supporting genuinely ‘economic’ migration has
suicide reduction effects. The results regarding the remaining variables are very similar
to our previous findings. That is, negative economic growth significantly increases overall
and male suicide rates, while fiscal austerity significantly increases only male suicide rates.
Moreover, increases in unemployment significantly increase suicide rates in all cases apart
from the female population which is relatively insulated. In addition, reduced fertility rates
significantly increase the risk of suicidality in all cases. Finally, increases in divorce rates
now significantly increase the risk of suicides only for the age group 25-44 years.
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
Recent investigations of the impact on Greek suicide rates from the 2008 financial crisis and
the subsequent Eurozone debt crisis of 2009 have restricted themselves to simple descriptive
or correlation analyses. Controlling for various socio-economic effects, this study presents a
statistically robust model to explain the influence on realised suicidality of the application
of fiscal austerity measures and variations in macroeconomic performance over the period
1968-2011.
The study provides novel results on the specific effects of fiscal austerity, among other
socio-economic variables, on suicide rates in Greece over the period under scrutiny. Our
findings suggest that fiscal austerity, higher unemployment rates, negative economic growth
and reduced fertility rates, lead to significant increases in overall suicide rates in Greece,
while increased alcohol consumption and divorce rates do not exert any significant influence
on overall suicide rates.
We find that the effects of fiscal austerity and economic growth are gender-specific, as
fiscal austerity measures and negative economic growth significantly increase male suicide
rates, while no significant effects of fiscal austerity and negative economic growth on female
suicide rates could be identified. It is also found that the effects of fiscal austerity on suicide
rates in Greece are age-specific, as fiscal austerity affects mostly the population between 45
and 89 years of age. Emigration proxied by inflow of remittances helps in mitigating some of
the negative effects of fiscal austerity on suicide rates for some of the population in the 10–24
years age group and for the female population. These results have important implications
for policy makers, and potentially for the implementation of specialised suicide prevention
programmes in Greece by national health agencies.
Given that austerity has been a worldwide phenomenon, especially among European
countries since the beginning of the financial crisis and the Eurozone debt crisis, an exami-
nation of the extent to which these results can be generalized to other European countries
is warranted.
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Figure 1: Real per capita GDP growth, Government Expenditure, Tax Revenues, Budget Deficit and Public
Debt in Greece, 1968–2011
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Figure 2: Suicide rates per 100,000 residents (%) and Unemployment rates (%) in Greece, 1968–2011
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Figure 3: Suicide rates by age group and gender in Greece, 1968–2009
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Table 3: Fiscal austerity and overall suicide rates in Greece, 1968–2011
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SRt−1 0.6515*** 0.5577*** 0.5080*** 0.4221*** 0.4418*** 0.2856** 0.2796**
(0.1046) (0.0924) (0.0971) (0.1191) (0.1193) (0.1214) (0.1338)
Growtht -0.0148*** -0.0165*** -0.0151*** -0.0139*** -0.0142*** -0.0165***
(0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0045)
Gov Expt -0.0035* -0.0031* -0.0031* -0.0032* -0.0041
(0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0024)
Unempt 0.0086** 0.0086** 0.0083* 0.0079
(0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0065)
Fertt -0.0109*** -0.0111*** -0.0126***
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0040)
Alct -0.0020 -0.0059
(0.0062) (0.0065)
Divt 0.0233
(0.0774)
Constant 0.4330*** 0.5752*** 0.6430*** 0.6847*** 0.8345*** 0.8559*** 0.8918***
(0.1284) (0.1138) (0.1191) (0.1307) (0.1246) (0.1396) (0.1836)
Obs. 43 43 43 43 43 43 41
R2 0.3721 0.5874 0.6205 0.6359 0.7075 0.7081 0.6357
Note: Robust SEs in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Fiscal austerity and male suicide rates in Greece, 1968–2011
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SRt−1 0.8443*** 0.7496*** 0.6883*** 0.3490*** 0.2761** 0.2780** 0.2657**
(0.1013) (0.0814) (0.0770) (0.1204) (0.1231) (0.1241) (0.1301)
Growtht -0.0152*** -0.0177*** -0.0150*** -0.0142*** -0.0136*** -0.0160***
(0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0038)
Gov Expt -0.0047** -0.0043** -0.0043** -0.0042** -0.0052**
(0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0023)
Unempt 0.0186*** 0.0217*** 0.0220*** 0.0191**
(0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0082)
Fertt -0.0060* -0.0055 -0.0081**
(0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0034)
Alct 0.0031 -0.0021
(0.0071) (0.0069)
Divt 0.0805
(0.0681)
Constant 0.2651 0.4489*** 0.5593*** 0.9798*** 1.0675*** 1.0312*** 1.0656***
(0.1707) (0.1394) (0.1301) (0.1684) (0.1691) (0.1784) (0.2116)
Obs. 43 43 43 43 43 43 41
R2 0.6123 0.7329 0.7635 0.8162 0.8290 0.8298 0.7924
Note: Robust SEs in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Fiscal austerity and female suicide rates in Greece, 1968–2011
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SRt−1 0.7426*** 0.7610*** 0.7551*** 0.5976*** 0.4329*** 0.4416*** 0.3673**
(0.0958) (0.1020) (0.1052) (0.1287) (0.1345) (0.1376) (0.1492)
Growtht -0.0086 -0.0076 -0.0106 -0.0112 -0.0130 -0.0171
(0.0069) (0.0064) (0.0068) 0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0103)
Gov Expt 0.0024 -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0018
(0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0055)
Unempt -0.0212** -0.0264*** -0.0273*** -0.0195
(0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0129)
Fertt -0.0250*** -0.0263*** -0.0265***
(0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0089)
Alct -0.0111 -0.0126
(0.0136) (0.0158)
Divt -0.1884
(0.1614)
Constant 0.1146* 0.1216** 0.1201* 0.3602*** 0.4366*** 0.5479*** 0.7024***
(0.0583) (0.0594) (0.0600) (0.1130) (0.1127) (0.1895) (0.2383)
Obs. 43 43 43 43 43 43 41
R2 0.5510 0.5655 0.5686 0.6099 0.6851 0.6891 0.6969
Note: Robust SEs in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Government deficit and overall suicide rates in Greece, 1988–2011
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SRt−1 0.5059** 0.3889** 0.1934 0.1813 0.0892 0.0493 -0.1305
(0.1952) (0.1780) (0.2084) (0.2274) (0.2119) (0.2583) (0.2760)
Growtht -0.0158*** -0.0182*** -0.0168*** -0.0153*** -0.0150*** -0.0018
(0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0043) (0.0090)
Deft 0.0128** 0.0114* 0.0088 0.0075 -0.0025
(0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0110)
Unempt 0.0054 0.0060 0.0104 0.0060
(0.0067) (0.0060) (0.0106) (0.0158)
Fertt -0.0084 -0.0077 -0.0046
(0.0069) (0.0073) (0.0086)
Alct 0.0124 0.0414
(0.0258) (0.0361)
Divt -0.0334
(0.1854)
Constant 0.6236** 0.7912*** 1.0326*** 0.9934*** 1.0981*** 0.9882*** 0.9734
(0.2426) (0.2250) (0.2585) (0.2601) (0.2435) (0.2874) (0.5962)
Obs. 24 24 23 23 23 23 21
R2 0.2160 0.4415 0.5483 0.5599 0.6030 0.6082 0.3355
Note: Robust SEs in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Government deficit and male suicide rates in Greece, 1988–2011
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SRt−1 0.6165** 0.3013 0.1257 -0.0538 -0.1021 -0.0944 -0.1977
(0.2910) 0.1955) (0.2277) (0.2624) (0.3078) (0.3364) (0.3584)
Growtht -0.0193*** -0.0216*** -0.0198*** -0.0192*** -0.0192*** -0.0063
(0.0055) (0.0050) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0101)
Deft 0.0130** 0.0111** 0.0097* 0.0101* 0.0019
(0.0054) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0088)
Unempt 0.0146* 0.0155* 0.0144 0.0076
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0126) (0.0162)
Fertt -0.0041 -0.0043 -0.0034
(0.0072) (0.0069) (0.0079)
Alct -0.0030 0.0325
(0.0264) (0.0422)
Divt 0.0699
(0.1585)
Constant 0.6747 1.2458*** 1.5494*** 1.7148*** 1.7880*** 1.8136*** 1.6195*
(0.4987) (0.3412) (0.3929) (0.3928) (0.4716) (0.4903) (0.8732)
Obs. 24 24 23 23 23 23 21
R2 0.2439 0.5214 0.6034 0.6661 0.6758 0.6761 0.2065
Note: Robust SEs in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 8: Government deficit and female suicide rates in Greece, 1988–2011
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SRt−1 0.5165*** 0.5309*** 0.4282** 0.3897* 0.3042* 0.1936 0.0849
(0.1552) (0.1662) (0.1768) (0.1948) (0.1661) (0.2653) (0.3235)
Growtht -0.0061 -0.0076 -0.0105 -0.0048 -0.0016 0.0058
(0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0138) (0.0143) (0.0115) (0.0241)
Deft 0.0175 0.0205 0.0121 0.0038 -0.0052
(0.0126) (0.0137) (0.0147) (0.0149) (0.0312)
Unempt -0.0119 -0.0147 0.0043 0.0032
(0.0177) (0.0192) (0.0179) (0.0330)
Fertt -0.0226 -0.0193 -0.0085
(0.0134) (0.0140) (0.0195)
Alct 0.0701 0.0435
(0.0825) (0.1200)
Divt -0.3988
(0.3447)
Constant 0.1319** 0.1354** 0.1551** 0.2860 0.3255 -0.4926 0.1582
(0.0594) (0.0618) (0.0585) (0.2103) (0.2308) (0.8277) (1.1883)
Obs. 24 24 23 23 23 23 21
R2 0.3214 0.3287 0.2714 0.2838 0.3647 0.4021 0.4522
Note: Robust SEs in parenthesis. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 9: Suicide rates, by age groups and sex in Greece, 1968–2009
Age group Sex Obs. Mean Std. Min. Max.
overall 42 1.6489 0.4321 0.7806 2.8388
10–24 male 42 2.4044 0.7000 1.1122 4.0993
female 42 0.8452 0.4815 0 2.2487
overall 42 3.5368 0.5861 2.1110 4.7410
25–44 male 42 5.5458 0.1129 3.1724 7.2461
female 42 1.5407 0.4060 0.7807 2.4681
overall 42 4.7334 0.7099 3.5735 6.5891
45–64 male 42 7.1781 1.0914 4.9488 10.216
female 42 2.4448 0.8342 1.0589 4.1987
overall 42 7.6553 1.6745 4.0567 10.3729
65–89 male 42 13.027 2.7215 7.3419 18.4373
female 42 3.6511 1.5041 1.1539 6.6505
Note: The analysis is based on data between 1968 and 2009, as suicide rates by age are not available for
2010 and 2011.
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